Francoise De Bel-Air

This chapter focuses on the policies and politics of Arab migration to the
Gulf States in the post-Arab uprisings’ period. It explores the following question: how do political and economic factors interplay in the policymaking by Arab sending states? The chapter puts forward the argument that, despite the common assumption that migration to the Gulf States is chiefly driven by economics, politics plays a major role in Arab migration patterns and policies, at the domestic, regional, and bilateral levels.(...)

De Bel-Air F. (2018) Asian Migration to the Gulf States in the Twenty-first Century. In: Chowdhury M., Irudaya Rajan S. (eds) South Asian Migration in the Gulf. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-71821-7; ISBN 978-3-319-71820-0), pp. 7-34).
The paper draws a general demographic picture of migration to the six Gulf countries, with an emphasis on Asian migrants. Section I assesses the link between oil prices, economic growth and labour needs. Section II highlights the political underpinnings of the national composition of migration flows to the region, until today. Section III examines some economic and socio-political challenges to reforming the kafala (sponsorship) system. Using most recent receiving countries’ statistics, Part IV describes Asian communities in the various GCC States, their size, national composition and most salient characteristics as of the mid-2010s. The conclusion assesses possible future trends for Asian migration to the GCC region, in the light of latest economic developments and the post-Arab uprisings’ political context.

The objective of the paper is to draw a sketch of the population and migration dynamics of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), using the data available from federal and emirate-level statistical bureaus.
In 2016, the total population of the UAE was estimated to be 9,121,167, thirty-two times the population counted in 1971, the year the country was established. The Emirate of Fujeirah had the smallest share of foreign nationals in its total population (61 per cent) while Dubai had the largest (91 per cent). Most expatriates were from Asia and especially from India: the India-UAE corridor could be the second largest in the world, and Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani expatriates outnumbered Emirati citizens around 2015. In the employed population, foreign nationals accounted for an even larger share (96 per cent of Dubai’s employed population in 2011). In 2016, federal and local governmental bodies employee figures were as follows: 78.5 per cent Emirati and a mere 6 per cent foreign nationals. Expatriates mostly worked in the private sector (73 per cent), while nationals accounted only for 8.3 per cent. Fifty-two per cent of female expatriates were employed in the domestic sector in 2016. Unlike in other GCC states, a quarter of the working expatriates in the UAE were in managerial posts, employed in a spectrum of activities across all sectors. The number of expatriates shot up during the 2000s, a period of spectacular economic growth propelled by soaring oil prices. Since the financial downturn in 2008, however, the economy has recovered and the hiring of foreign workers is resuming, stimulated by large-scale infrastructure projects, especially in Dubai. Nonetheless, reforms in immigration policies are now being undertaken, fuelled by security concerns, pressures from human rights’ protection bodies, and the need to bolster citizens’ employment (Emiratisation) and upskill the labour force to implement a knowledge-based economy in the country.
To that end, the planned introduction of skills certification requirements for migrants by countries of destination is likely to have significant impact on the size and composition of future migration flows, migrants’ activities, and their expectations in terms of rights.

Migration from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries has been considered a growing security threat in the EU and Gulf states following the 9/11 attacks and the Arab uprisings. Since 2011, the economic slowdown, regime changes and socio-political instability have spurred growing migration pressure from SEM countries. However, the securitisation of migration of young citizens from these countries in the EU and the Gulf states is manifested in the drastic limitation of migrants’ inflows, and in the selection of prospective migrants on demographic, socio-economic and political grounds. Today’s ‘governmentality’ of youth migration from SEM countries poses ethical and development-related issues.

In 2016, Qatar ranked first worldwide in terms of per capita GDP. This is due to its huge hydrocarbon reserves and to the small size of its resident population (2.5 million in June 2017). Exploiting the hydrocarbon resources and channelling them into ambitious development policies required massive imports of foreign labour. The country’s total population has grown seven-fold since the mid-1980s; moreover, foreign nationals made up an estimated 91 per cent of all residents (aged 15 and above) and up to 95 per cent of all employed population in 2015. The awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar in December 2010 turned the spotlight on the country’s dilemma regarding the “number vs. rights tradeoff” issue: Qatar has one of the most constraining kafala systems in the region, which underwent only minor changes in a reform enacted in December 2016. Paradoxically, demographic data also indicate that a growing share of foreigners live with their families and give birth in the country. Among these may be Syrian nationals who have come to the country since 2011. As of 2017, foreign population growth rates
have started decelerating, as past infrastructural projects achieved completion, new migration policies that privilege skills over number are initiated, and political uncertainty looms.

Since the late 2000s, all Gulf States have been conducting widely-publicized campaigns aiming at regularizing foreign residents in irregular administrative situation, as well as clampdowns on so-called “illegal” migrants, detentions and deportations. Using the material gathered by the Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme, the chapter presents, discusses and assesses datasets touching on the topic of irregular migration, available in Gulf country statistics. Part I presents methodologies, statistical and administrative apparatuses involved in the production of data, and discusses estimates available on undocumented migrant stocks in the region. Part II assesses the sources and the limits posed by datasets aiming at estimating flows of migrants in irregular situation to and from Gulf States. Part III deals with their socio-demographic profile. The paper concludes that data is scarce in most countries in the region. The various aspects of irregularity and the process of falling into this state cannot be traced with existing datasets. These focus on specific subpopulations constructed for the purpose of policy action: deported or regularized populations, border arrests, etc., hence fragmenting the stocks and flows of undocumented migrants in various categories, categories that are sometimes overlapping, or disconnected from each other. Available data thus have to be used with caution: political stakes are at play in the constructions and representations of irregularity; and in the selection of the data released to the public. Defining irregularity as a clear-cut and stable phenomenon is impossible.

In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, (i.e., first-generation, born in Lebanon) resided abroad. Meanwhile, in early 2016, it was said that “Lebanon hosts approximately 1.1 million refugees from Syria which amounts to around one in five people in the country”,  or “one in four” according to other estimates (...cont'd).

In April 2014, the population of Tunisia stood at 10,982,754, only 0.5 percent of whom were foreign immigrants according to the country’s sixth census. First-generation, Tunisia-born migrants residing abroad stood at around 543,000, of whom 81 percent were to be found in Europe that year. As for “Tunisians Residing Abroad” (Tunisiens Résidant à l’Etranger”), first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generation Tunisians, they numbered about 1.2 million according to the records of the Office for Tunisians Abroad (OTE). Tunisia is, therefore, primarily an emigration country.

The paper seeks to explore the reasons behind the persistent exclusion of young migrants from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries in their two main areas of destination, the Gulf States and the EU. It focuses on youth from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey, during the key period of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath. The paper covers the period until June 2015. Its aim is two-fold: first, to describe the characteristics and institutional background of the migration policies applied to youth from the six countries, in their two main areas of destination; second, to understand the political motives underlying recent changes
to these policies, following the uprisings. In a perspective of political demography informed by Foucault’s theories, migration policies are envisaged as technocratic discursive practices.

As of 2015, the population of Turkey stood at 78,741,053, of whom 1,592,437 were, according to Turkish statistics, migrants (born abroad). If we add to this figure the three million refugees registered in the country (of whom about 2.7 million are from Syria), a minimal estimate of the share of the foreign-born immigrants in Turkey’s total population as of December 2015 would be 5.6 percent.

Jordan's last population census gave the total population of the country as 9,531,712 in November 2015, 2,918,125 (31 per cent) of whom were foreign nationals. If accurate, these numbers indicate that Jordan is a major migrant-receiving country. Jordan has the highest refugee-to-population ratio and the country is also now the top refugee hosting country in absolute numbers. Indeed, it hosted more than 2.7 million registered refugees as of September 2016; of whom 2.1 million persons of Palestinian descent registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) who have lived in the country for decades; and 664,100 refugees under UNHCR's mandate including Syrians and Iraqis. Besides, Jordan is a migrant-sending country too: an estimated 10 percent of Jordan's nationals (700 to 800,000) are expatriated abroad, most of them to the Gulf States.

The chapter reviews migration patterns to and from the 22 Arab countries, and the profile of young Arab migrants in the GCC and in Western OECD countries. It then examines young Arabs’ reasons to migrate and possible exclusion factors, and envisages the role of migration policies in receiving or sending states, before emphasizing the role of inclusion in the migration process. Lastly, the chapter highlights impediments to the mobility of labor. The chapter emphasizes the range and diversity of capabilities allowing young Arabs to migrate in sizeable number to other countries inside the region, as well as outside the Arab region. However, it also questions the origin countries’ continuous reliance on youth’ exit in order to curb unemployment and increase national households’ income through remittances.

In September 2014, the total population of Morocco stood at
33,848,242, and only 0.2 per cent were foreign immigrants.
Morocco is, indeed, a major migrant-sending country. First generation, Morocco-born migrants residing abroad stood at
2.8 million, of whom 2.4 million were in Europe as of 2011, the
largest number from any Southern Mediterranean country. As for “Moroccans Residing Abroad” (“Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger”), who are first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generations, estimates vary between 4 and 4.5 million. (Cont'd)

As the migrant crisis escalates at Europe’s borders, the Gulf States have been blamed for having offered “zero resettlement” to Syrian refugees. In response to these statements, some Gulf States claim that they have actually relaxed their entry and residency laws to accommodate sizeable numbers of Syrian
nationals since the start of the conflict. The paper assesses these claims using statistics available from these countries, as well as declarations from official bodies released in the local press. It appears that, besides being major aid donors to Arab countries sheltering Syrian refugees, most Gulf States have passed various measures destined to facilitate the entry and stay of Syrians since 2011.

The Syrian conflict started in March 2011 with a few popular demonstrations and swiftly escalated into a civil war involving international actors. Of the approximately 22 million Syrians recorded in the country on the eve of the war, as of November
2015, perhaps a quarter of a million have been killed; 7.6 million were internally displaced;  and an estimated 5.6 million left the country. Of these, the great majority (4.3 million, or 76 percent of all refugees) moved to the countries neighbouring Syria: Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, as well as, in lesser numbers, to Egypt. (...)

Irregular migration has great resonance in the Gulf, just as in the West. Migrants in irregular situation avoid state administrative procedures and so their numbers are unknown. The largest amnesty (Saudi Arabia 2013) would have affected more than 50 per cent of the migrants in the country.
Irregular migration is by definition a breach of legislations that regulate the migrant’s status. In the Gulf States it is, in particular, a by-product of: the sponsorship (kafâla) system that
hampers both a migrant’s individual freedom of movement and the free functioning of the labour market; nationalisation policies that continue to extend the list of occupations reserved for nationals; and nationality laws that bar citizenship to all but a very few first- and second-generation migrants. Irregular migration also results from contexts characterising some sending states (poverty, corruption, failing social contracts), which forces nationals from these countries to move to more
dynamic labour markets. Moreover, leaving the recruitment of foreign workers to private brokers also creates conditions that lead to migrants’ “merchandisation,” and hence abuses, in many cases. Finally, irregularity also stems from migrants’ extreme determination in pursuing their goals and ambitions, whatever their status in the destination country. Efforts must be made by countries of origin and destination to curtail irregular migration.
In the Gulf States, this may be addressed in several ways: by improving the working and living conditions of foreign workers; by amending sponsorship rules; by granting citizenship to select categories of migrants; and by disentangling migration laws from labour laws. Initiatives in this regard have been taken by some countries and need to be strengthened in the future.

The objective of the paper is to draw a sketch of UAE’s population and migration dynamics, using the scarce data available from the federal and emirate-level statistical bureaus. In 2010, expatriates in the UAE were estimated to number 7,316,073 persons, twenty times the 1975’s figure of 356,343. Foreign nationals thus made up 88.5 per cent of the country’s total population; most were believed to come from Asia and especially from India. In the employed population, foreign nationals accounted for an even larger share (96 per cent of the Dubai’s employed population in 2011). Non-Emiratis comprised 40 per cent of the UAE’s public sector’s workforce in 2013, but as much as 99.5 per cent of those employed in the private sector. Unlike in other GCC states, a quarter of working expatriates were in managerial posts, employed across all activities’ spectrum. Expatriates’ demographic expansion mounted during the 2000s, a period of spectacular economic growth fuelled by soaring oil prices. Since 2008’s financial downturn, however, the economy recovered and the hiring of foreign workers has resumed, stimulated by large-scale projects such as Dubai’s Expo 2020. Nonetheless, reforms in immigration policies are now undertaken, fuelled by security concerns and pressures from human rights’ protection bodies. The reality of some expatriates’ settlement is also witnessed in numbers (expatriate children aged 0-14 outnumbered Emirati
children already in 2005), while mixed marriages are acknowledged in policies: some naturalisations of children of Emirati mothers have been performed since 2011.

In 2013, Qatar ranked second worldwide in terms of per capita GDP. This is due to its huge endowment in hydrocarbon and the size of its national population, the smallest in all GCC countries. Exploiting the resources and channeling them to ambitious development policies required massive imports of foreign labour force. The country’s total population thus quintupled since the mid-1980s; moreover, foreign nationals made an estimated 85.7 percent of all residents and up to 94.1 percent of all employed population in 2013. The awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar in December 2010 brought out the features of the country’s dilemma, the “number vs. rights trade-off”: Qatar has one of the most constraining kafala systems in the region. Paradoxically, however, demographic data also indicate that a growing share of foreigners live with their families, give birth in the country and intermarry with Qataris. The strict separation between nationals and migrants could thus start slowly eroding.

"Abstract: Saudi Arabia is a prime destination and source of remittances from workers for many countries in Asia and the Arab world. As of mid-2013, expatriates made up 32 percent of the Kingdom’s population, most of them coming from South Asia. They accounted for 56.5 percent of the employed population and 89 percent of the private sector workforce. Since September 2011, and in spite of a spurt in foreign labour recruitment since the mid-2000s, a voluntary policy called Nitaqat aims at ‘Saudising’ the Kingdom’s workforce. The most recent data also show the scale of the irregular migration phenomenon in Saudi Arabia: the amnesty campaign which started in April 2013 allowed 4.7 million foreign workers to regularise their status, while an ongoing crackdown on illegals forced one million to leave the Kingdom in 2013 alone, of which (as of November 30, 2013) 547,000 were deported.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia; Foreign Population; National Population; Nationals and Foreign Labour; Migration Policy; Statistics; Saudisation; Irregularity; Amnesty; Deportation; Citizenship.
"

Mid-2013, estimates of Bahrain’s population stood at 1,253,191 persons, of whom 638,361 (51 per cent) were foreign nationals. Most were from Asia (85 per cent) and especially from India (half of all foreign residents). Eighty per cent of expatriates are employed. They account for 77 per cent of the employed population and 81 per cent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians are overwhelmingly involved in services and “blue collar” occupations, while Arabs more often fill managerial posts. Immigration flows to the Kingdom increased significantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices and the ensuing boom in the construction and services sectors. This demonstrates the difficulty to reconcile labour reforms, and especially, the Bahrainisation of the work force, with the maximisation of economic productivity.

As of May 27, 2015, estimates of Oman’s total population stood at 4,187,516 persons, of whom 1,849,412 (44.2 per cent) were foreign nationals. Foreign workers are overwhelmingly from the
Asian subcontinent: Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis together made up 87 per cent of the workforce in 2013. Eighty-two per cent of all foreign workers were employed in the private sector that year, and 12 per cent were filling managerial and “white collar” posts. The flow of foreign workers to Oman has been rising over the 2000s up till today. Lagging youth employment and rising poverty levels spurred popular protests in 2011 which slowed down economic diversification and the private sector’s development process. However, sectoral Omanisation quotas are now enforced and the hiring of Omani nationals in every business has become mandatory. Aggressive measures also target foreign residents in irregular situation which has led to several massive amnesty and deportation campaigns since 2010.

"As of December 2012, 68 percent of residents in Kuwait were expatriates. Most come from Asia and especially from India (30 percent of all foreign residents). Three-quarters of expatriates are active. They account for 83 percent of the total active population and 93 percent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians are mainly involved in the services and craft sectors, while Arabs more often fill managerial posts. Recent flows suggest a shift in recruitment policies, towards upgrading the workforce’s level of qualifications and occupations.
Data also show the extent of forced migration from Kuwait: 400,000 Arabs, most of them of Palestinian origin, were forced to flee the country after the First Gulf War. Also, Kuwait’s stateless residents (the Bidun) have been compelled to emigrate since 1985, while those still in the country are considered illegal residents. 
"

The paper addresses the historical and institutional background of labour management policies in Saudi Arabia. It envisages it as a long-term, structural impediment to the successful and rapid implementation of Saudization (localisation) of the labour force in the Kingdom. The paper thus emphasises the socio-political stakes and challenges to localisation of the labour force and, more generally, economic and labour reform in the Gulf States. Since the onset of the Arab uprisings, however, unemployment among Saudis, and especially women, has become a burning political issue. Governmental actors had no choice but to attempt to regain control over the economy and the management of the labour market. In September 2011, in spite of a spurt in foreign labour recruitment since the mid-2000s, a voluntary policy called “Nitaqat” aiming to “Saudize” the Kingdom’s workforce was enacted. This paper reviews its characteristics and points to its all-encompassing design as it addresses the socio-political context of Saudization and therefore is more likely to have a lasting effect than previous workforce localisation initiatives.

(Introduction)
The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  rank as the third largest migrant- receiving region in the world. They are the largest destination for migrants from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Egypt, Jordan or Yemen, which are themselves amongst the largest countries of origin of migrants. Migrant flows from South Asia and the Arab world to the Gulf States are by far the world largest movements of south-to-south migration.  Indeed, in spite of very high (Qatar, United Arab Emirates) and high (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait) Human Development Index rankings which account for their high levels of income per capita, health coverage and education achievements, the six Gulf States still have a number of typical stigmas of the developing south (mostly extractive economies, political authoritarianism, low status of women, etc.). Therefore, migration originating in the Arab and Asian south and destined to the Gulf is genuinely of the south-to-south kind.
Since its inception in the 1930s, immigration to the Gulf has responded to hugely imbalanced endowments of capital, to gigantic surpluses of financial capital (oil) combined with acute deficits of human capital: i.e. low level of industrial skills among local workers and very scarce populations in relation with desert land in the small sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf shores. As a consequence, the large scale of foreign labor imported to exploit hydrocarbons resources created unique societies in the GCC countries. Nowhere else in the world is the share of the nationals so small in proportion of resident populations: from 68 percent in Saudi Arabia down to 11 percent only in the United Arab Emirates in the early 2010s. Yet, despite their numbers, non-citizens have little social and no political membership in GCC countries. As temporary contractual laborers, they are expected to leave upon the termination of their employment contracts. Long-term settlement and citizenship acquisition are not an issue, for Gulf countries do not conceive of themselves as immigration countries. This chapter aims at explaining the combination, so peculiar to Gulf societies, between such exceptional levels of immigration and the exceptional closure of local societies to these flows. Through the lens of political demography, it emphasizes the structural nature of the link between oil wealth, migration, and the social contract in the Gulf States.
The first part of the article argues that migration flows to and from the Gulf States are driven by four distinct sets of political events. These affected oil prices and defined four phases in the Gulf States’ migration policies and citizenship-building process. During the first phase, political allegiance to the Gulf rulers was negotiated for in return for redistribution of the oil wealth, which conditioned citizenship. The second phase sustained this rent-based social contract by increasingly delegating productive activities to foreign laborers. The third phase marked by a drop in oil revenues and in migrants’ stocks and flows forced rulers to renegotiate the social contract by reinstating productive, non-State labor as a privilege for citizens. Therefore, hikes in oil prices and the ensuing fresh rise in labor immigration in the last phase (the 2000s) further affected Gulf States’ socio-political cohesion. Rising nationals’ unemployment incarnated the growing political rift opposing citizenries on the one hand, and business people favoring cheap foreign manpower, non-nationals accepting private sectors’ low salaries and labor conditions considered demeaning for citizens and, mostly, local rulers unable to guarantee citizens’ income and privileged living conditions, on the other hand.
Indeed, as is described in part 2, the formation of dual labor markets and dual societies in the region, entailed by the supremacy of nationals over non-nationals in economy and politics and by the limitation of social and spatial interaction between the two populations, was viewed as essential in the reproduction of the fragile rentier social contract. The Kafala (sponsorship) institution, especially, appears instrumental in enhancing foreign laborers flows, in subordinating them to citizens and, consequently, in sustaining the social contract in the region.
The Arab uprisings in GCC states targeted foreign laborers and States’ inefficiency in managing national labor markets to the benefit of nationals. The third section thus argues that the exceptional scale of policies launched by local governments since 2011 (deportation of irregular foreign labor; regularization campaigns; voluntary workforce nationalization policies and labor reforms) is an attempt at gaining control over the management of labor in order to balance out three sets of pressing constraints: securing citizens’ allegiance; sustaining economic growth to absorb job seekers; and addressing worldwide concern for migrants’ rights’ breaches in the region.
The article concludes that the GCC countries are now at a crossroads and faced with two choices: on the one hand, limit the numbers and increase foreign workers’ rights (i.e., revert the “number-vs-rights tradeoff”  which characterized the now-outdated rentier social contract), or, on the other hand, sustain high levels of immigration, especially from available huge pools of Asian manpower, but make Gulf societies more permeable to socio-demographic input from non-nationals. In both cases, the role of migration in the Gulf States’ social contract will change radically. The data used in this chapter are exclusively from national statistical sources from the Gulf States.

‘Arab Springs’ and the Management of Foreign Labour in the Gulf Countries: Towards a Political Reform Process?

Political unrests ongoing since 2010 in the Arab world also reached the Gulf States. The region, with its oil and gas wealth, still experienced protests against rising unemployment rates and dropping purchasing powers, despite the fact that migrant labourers account for up to 97% of private sectors’ manpower in certain countries of the region. Drawing mainly on Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as examples, the paper thus explores the political significance of the protests as well as their relationship to the many ongoing reforms in migratory policies in the Gulf states.
The paper uses political demography as a method for analyzing migration dynamics to the region and the sociopolitical role of foreigners there. It points at the latter’s agency in designing the ‘rentier pact’ binding together rulers and citizenries, until the 1990’s. Since then, economic globalization and other factors put nationals and expatriates in competition for the same jobs. New migratory reforms, spurred by recent unrests, address such challenges. By improving labour conditions, curbing illegal residencies, by reforming sponsorship (kafala) and, mostly, by running voluntary manpower’ “localization” schemes, regimes attempt at re-incorporating labour within the realm of redistribution. Gulf regimes thus run counter to the general trend of granting political concessions as was witnessed elsewhere in Arab world. 

‘Printemps arabes’ et gestion des migrations dans les pays du Golfe : vers une réforme politique ?

Les contestations politiques en cours dans le monde arabe depuis la fin 2010 ont aussi touché les pétromonarchies du Golfe. Mais cette région, malgré sa richesse, a connu des revendications touchant à la pénurie d’emplois et à la faiblesse des salaires, alors même que les étrangers forment jusqu’à 97 % de la main-d’œuvre des secteurs privés de ces pays. Centré principalement sur le Bahreïn et l’Arabie saoudite, l’article explore la signification politique de ces protestations et s’interroge sur leur lien avec les nombreuses réformes des politiques migratoires engagées récemment dans la région.
L’analyse, en termes de démographie politique, des dynamiques migratoires et du rôle socio-politique des étrangers dans les pays du Golfe met en relief leur rôle d’agents de la construction du ‘pacte rentier’ liant les régimes et les populations jusqu’en 1990. Entre autres facteurs, la mondialisation économique place désormais les citoyens en concurrence directe avec les étrangers sur les marchés du travail. Les nouvelles réformes apportées aux politiques migratoires en réaction aux soulèvements (amélioration des conditions de travail, lutte contre les travailleurs illégaux, réforme de la kafala et surtout « localisation » accélérée des forces de travail) répondent à ces défis et tentent de réintégrer le travail dans un processus de redistribution, à rebours des libéralisations politiques observées dans d’autres pays.

(English follows)

‘Printemps arabes’ et gestion des migrations dans les pays du Golfe : vers une réforme politique ?

Les contestations politiques en cours dans le monde arabe depuis la fin 2010 ont aussi touché les pétromonarchies du Golfe. Mais cette région, malgré sa richesse, a connu des revendications touchant à la pénurie d’emplois et à la faiblesse des salaires, alors même que les étrangers forment jusqu’à 97 % de la main-d’œuvre des secteurs privés de ces pays. Centré principalement sur le Bahreïn et l’Arabie saoudite, l’article explore la signification politique de ces protestations et s’interroge sur leur lien avec les nombreuses réformes des politiques migratoires engagées récemment dans la région.
L’analyse, en termes de démographie politique, des dynamiques migratoires et du rôle socio-politique des étrangers dans les pays du Golfe met en relief leur rôle d’agents de la construction du ‘pacte rentier’ liant les régimes et les populations jusqu’en 1990. Entre autres facteurs, la mondialisation économique place désormais les citoyens en concurrence directe avec les étrangers sur les marchés du travail. Les nouvelles réformes apportées aux politiques migratoires en réaction aux soulèvements (amélioration des conditions de travail, lutte contre les travailleurs illégaux, réforme de la kafala et surtout « localisation » accélérée des forces de travail) répondent à ces défis et tentent de réintégrer le travail dans un processus de redistribution, à rebours des libéralisations politiques observées dans d’autres pays.

‘Arab Springs’ and the Management of Foreign Labour in the Gulf Countries: Towards a Political Reform Process?

Political unrests ongoing since 2010 in the Arab world also reached the Gulf States. The region, with its oil and gas wealth, still experienced protests against rising unemployment rates and dropping purchasing powers, despite the fact that migrant labourers account for up to 97% of private sectors’ manpower in certain countries of the region. Drawing mainly on Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as examples, the paper thus explores the political significance of the protests as well as their relationship to the many ongoing reforms in migratory policies in the Gulf states.
The paper uses political demography as a method for analyzing migration dynamics to the region and the sociopolitical role of foreigners there. It points at the latter’s agency in designing the ‘rentier pact’ binding together rulers and citizenries, until the 1990’s. Since then, economic globalization and other factors put nationals and expatriates in competition for the same jobs. New migratory reforms, spurred by recent unrests, address such challenges. By improving labour conditions, curbing illegal residencies, by reforming sponsorship (kafala) and, mostly, by running voluntary manpower’ “localization” schemes, regimes attempt at re-incorporating labour within the realm of redistribution. Gulf regimes thus run counter to the general trend of granting political concessions as was witnessed elsewhere in Arab world.

(English follows)
L’articulation entre la question des migrations et les dynamiques sociopolitiques a-t-elle une pertinence dans l’analyse des soulèvements dans le monde arabe ? Dans une démarche de démographie politique, nous examinons comment, au cours des décennies passées, l’impact démographique des migrations a influencé la structure des sociétés de la région et les dynamiques de leur croissance. La « porte ouverte » à l’émigration des chômeurs et des opposants a renforcé les structures de la domination dans les pays de la région. La fermeture des frontières de l’Europe ou la contraction des marchés du travail du Golfe a donc pu stimuler le rejet des régimes autoritaires. L’instrumentalisation politique des migrants a aussi affecté la cohésion des sociétés arabes : les « naturalisations politiques » de migrants sunnites au Bahreïn, la mise en concurrence des travailleurs locaux et étrangers dans le contexte de la transition post-rentière des années 1990 à 2010 au Moyen-Orient dévoilent les divergences de représentation de la citoyenneté opposant les régimes et certains segments de leurs populations. Enfin, les inégalités d’accès à la migration internationale semblent corrélées aux inégalités régionales de développement, par exemple en Tunisie ou en Jordanie.

Abstract: The article focusses on the issue of migration and its role in spurring certain sociopolitical features which gave way to the Arab uprisings. Using political demography as a methodological framework, I shed light on the way the demographic impact of migration influenced the structures and dynamics of Arab societies. For instance, the “open door” policy to emigration of the unemployed and potential opponents strengthened the structures of domination in the region. Hence, the progressive closure of European borders and Gulf labor market to Arab youth may have stirred up the massive popular rejection of authoritarian regimes. The political engineering of foreign migrants also affected the cohesion of Arab societies : debates on the “political naturalizations” of Sunni migrants (Bahrain), as well as unfavored competition between local and foreign laborers in the context of the current post-rentier political transition, both emphasize the diverging representations of citizenship opposing certain segments of labor-importing countries’ populations and local regimes. Lastly, regional inequalities in the access to international migration seem in correlation with regional inequalities in development (Tunisia, Jordan).

The contribution aims at laying some ground to bridge the knowledge gap regarding Arab female highly-skilled workers in the Gulf. Relying mostly on macro-demographic and survey data, it provides elements for describing this population in the Gulf countries, their integration into the labor force, and their patterns of migration to the region.

The chapter tackles the latest policies aiming at increasing employment of nationals of GCC states and reducing reliance on foreign workers in the region. It assesses outcomes of such policies. It then reviews legal measures taken by Gulf states towards expatriates.

La transition démographique dans la plupart des pays arabes semblait acquise. Le nombre d’enfants par femme diminuait régulièrement. Or voici qu’il repart à la hausse, un phénomène rare quelles que soient les sociétés. Les raisons sont multiples, complexes et bouleversent les idées reçues.

The demographic transition in most Arab countries seemed
irreversible. The levels of childbearing were steadily declining. And yet
suddenly they have begun to rise, a rare occurrence in any society. The
reasons are many, complex and overturn common beliefs.

بدا التحوّل الديمغرافي في معظم البلدان العربيّة لفترة من الزمن أمراً مفروغاً
منه. فقد كان عدد الأطفال لكل امرأة في انخفاض منتظم. وها هو يعود للارتفاع،
مشكّلا ظاهرة نادرة في المجتمعات كافة. ولهذه الظاهرة أسباب عدّة، معقّدة،
مناقضة لكلّ الأفكار المسبقة

Call for papers:
Thematic issue on "Marriage and Family in the Gulf today", forthcoming in the peer-reviewed journal Arabian Humanities, Spring 2018.
Peer-reviewed, leading French scientific journal on the Gulf Peninsula (social sciences).
Issue will be in English.
Deadline for the reception of the proposals: 3 January 2017.

The aim of the paper is to analyse the dominant trends of demographic evolution in South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries since the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the evolution of demographic policies and popular debates surrounding the shift. It seeks to highlight from these two sources the deep socio-demographic rifts dividing youth and societies in the SEM countries today, in the mid-2010s. Additionally, it attempts to pinpoint how reforms (or attempts at reform) of family law actually reflect the goals and stakes of “high politics,” regarding the role of youth as agents in the reproduction of socio-political structures.

(English follows)

Mariage et famille dans le Golfe arabe : vers un bouleversement politique ?

Depuis la fin des années 1970, la nuptialité a connu des transformations importantes dans tous les pays arabes, dont les plus significatives sont l’augmentation de l’âge moyen au premier mariage et l’émergence du célibat féminin. Les États du Golfe, étudiés dans cet article, n’échappent pas à cette évolution. Or, le mariage dans le monde arabe, rite de passage à l’âge adulte, est aussi le lieu de la reproduction des institutions : le mariage est donc une question politique. Après une présentation des évolutions récentes de la nuptialité dans les six pays du Golfe, l’article analyse l’impact de ces mutations sur les dynamiques sociales caractérisant cette région (les contraintes socio-économiques posées au choix du conjoint, les relations entre sexes et entre générations, l’évolution des structures familiales). Les données montrent que sont partout défiés l’idéal arabe du mariage précoce et universel, la domination masculine et celle des aînés. En conséquence, cette évolution des comportements sociodémographiques pourrait également menacer les pouvoirs autoritaires et « néopatriarcaux » de la région. Une analyse des débats populaires et politiques menés sur la question du mariage en Arabie saoudite montre en effet que celle-ci est instrumentalisée dans le processus de réforme sociopolitique en cours dans le royaume, afin de contrer l’emprise de certains acteurs sur le champ social.

Mots clés : nuptialité ; mariage ; divorce ; famille ; structures familiales, démographie politique ; politique démographique ; politique sociale ; pays du Golfe ; Arabie Saoudite ; Koweït ; Émirats arabes unis ; Oman ; Qatar ; Bahreïn.

Marriage and Family in the Arab Gulf States: Towards a Political Transition?

Since the end of the 1970’s, marriage patterns have undergone tremendous changes in every Arab country. Most significant among them are the increase in the age at first marriage and the emergence of female celibacy, as experienced in the Arab Gulf. Yet, marriage in the Arab world is a rite of passage to adulthood, as well as an essential element in the process of reproducing sociopolitical institutions. This gives the marriage issue a political outreach which is the topic of the paper. After describing recent changes in the marriage patterns experienced in the six Arab Gulf States over the last four decades, the paper analyses the impact of such changes on the social dynamics characterizing the region (socioeconomic constraints put to marrying and spouse’ choice; male-female and intergenerational relationships; the evolution of family structures). Data emphasize that everywhere in the region, the ideal of early and universal marriages, as well as males’ and elders’ domination are fading. Therefore, the evolution of socio-demographic behaviors may challenge authoritarian and “neopatriarcal” powers in the region. As the matter of facts, the analysis of popular and political debates tackling the marriage issue in Saudi Arabia shows that the topic is instrumentalised within the reform process ongoing in the Kingdom, in order to counter the influence of some political forces.

Keywords: marriage; divorce; family; family structures; political demography; demographic policy; social policy; Gulf States; Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; United Arab Emirates; Oman; Qatar; Bahrain.

Fighting poverty, “making up” a new society. Around the use of Human development in Jordan.

Using Foucault’ approach of public policies in terms of “police”, this paper explores, in the case of Jordan, the political outreach of defining, measuring and acting upon poverty using UNDP’s Human Development concept and indices. The paper analyses the 2004’ Jordan Human Development Report (JHDR), which “places the poor at the centre of analysis and attempts to capture the diverse and dynamic characteristics of poverty through the eyes of the poor themselves”, and addresses poverty as a lack of human development. Yet, in this case human development rather appears as an instrument of institutional reform attempting at “making up people”, at engineering the moulding of a new society, globalised and market-led.

Lutter contre la pauvreté, “façonner” une nouvelle société. Autour de l’usage du Développement humain en Jordanie.

Cette contribution vise à éclairer la portée politique de l’utilisation du concept et des indices de développement humain du PNUD pour l’analyse du phénomène de la pauvreté, sur le terrain de la Jordanie. L’article porte sur le Rapport sur le Développement humain (RDH) en Jordanie de 2004, qui « place les pauvres au centre de l’analyse et cherche à saisir de la bouche des pauvres eux-mêmes les caractéristiques de la pauvreté », en abordant le phénomène comme résultant d’un niveau insuffisant de développement humain. Pourtant, notre analyse montre que cette publication ressort plutôt d’une opération de « police » (selon les termes de Foucault), qu’elle sous-tend un processus de réforme institutionnelle visant à « façonner les gens », sur le modèle d’une société inscrite dans la globalisation néolibérale.

Les migrations internationales constituent aujourd'hui, dans toutes les régions du globe, un enjeu majeur du politique. Elles font l'objet d'accords internationaux, engendrent des litiges diplomatiques et, surtout, défient en permanence l'ordre du « national ». L'immigrant se heurte à des ...

Les migrations internationales constituent aujourd’hui, dans toutes les régions du globe, un enjeu majeur du politique. Elles font l’objet d’accords internationaux, engendrent des litiges diplomatiques et, surtout, défient en permanence l’ordre du « national ». L’immigrant se heurte à des frontières, spatiales et administratives ; l’émigrant renégocie en permanence ses relations à son pays d’origine. Aussi les migrations obligent-elles sans cesse à repenser les frontières, les manières de conceptualiser un territoire et, plus largement, la souveraineté politique d’un État-nation. Dans un Moyen-Orient arabe en pleine crise sociale, économique et politique, l’intensification des mouvements d’immigration et d’émigration, mais aussi celle des migrations de transit, est porteuse, en ce tournant de siècle, d’enjeux politiques spécifiques. Dans ce contexte émergent de nouveaux modes d’instrumentalisation, par les acteurs du politique, des mouvements migratoires intra-régionaux et internationaux, dont ce livre explore des exemples significatifs : « mobilité du travail et du capital » comme stratégie de politique intérieure et étrangère en Jordanie, rôle des États dans les migrations de travail (travail domestique en Jordanie et dans les pays du Golfe ; main-d’œuvre syrienne au Liban), gestion des réfugiés palestiniens dans les pays arabes, défi posé par les membres de cette diaspora à la rigidité des concepts de frontière et de citoyenneté portés par les acteurs du processus de paix, sort des réfugiés non palestiniens au Liban, caractère éminemment politique des débats sur la nationalité dans ce pays, rôle de l’Église maronite, acteur désormais transnational, sur la scène politique libanaise…